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-Note: An Effori to Revise ihe Minnesota
Bil of Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
The past ten years have witnessed a great deal of activity in
various states directed towards the writing of new constitutions
or the revision of old ones. Although the bills of rights have not
usually been a central focus of state constitutional revision, they
have been included in the scope of revision efforts. Partly be-
cause of the overwhelming impact of the Federal Bill of Rights
and partly because of a feeling that fundamental rights are al-
ready adequately protected in state constitutions, some commen-
tators question whether state bills of rights should receive any
attention at all.' Others believe that there are new emerging
rights which must be identified and given constitutional protec-
tion by the states and that obsolete provisions should be elimi-
nated from present constitutions.2
This note will attempt to analyze the function of a bill of
rights in a state constitution and then to examine recent efforts
to revise the Minnesota Bill of Rights. The Minnesota experience
can perhaps demonstrate some of the goals that may be formu-
lated in revising a bill of rights. It also provides one illustration
of the drafting problems and political considerations involved in
such a process.3
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. NEED FOR STATE BILS OF RIGHTs
While all state constitutions contain a bill of rights, the Fed-
1. See Rankin, The Bill of Rights, in W. GRAvEs, MAJOR PROBLEMS
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIsioN 162 (1960).
2. See, e.g., R. RANxIN, STATE CONsTrrTIONs: BnL OF RIGHTS 20
(1960); Sturm, Bils of Rights in New State Constitutions, in C. BEcK.
LAw AND JusTicE: ESSAYS 3N HONOR OF RoERT S. RANxIN 178-80 (1970).
For criteria for inclusion and exclusion in a constitution see R.
DIsm&AN, STATE CONSTITUTONS: TE SHAPE OF THE DocuiTENT (1960); F.
GRAD, TE STATE CoNsTmTIoN: ITS FUNCTION AND FORM FOR OUR Tnvm
25-33 (1968); COLUMBiA UNIVERSITY LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND,
Tm DRAFTIxG OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1-36 (F. Grad ed. 1967) [herein-
after cited as F. GRAD].
3. See RECENT REVIION, § II. C., p. 162 infra, for a general discus-
sion of the revision process.
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eral Bill of Rights has played the major role in the protection of
the rights of individuals and groups. The Federal Bill of Rights
may be differentiated from state bills of rights on the basis of de-
velopment and impact. Reasons which have been advanced to
explain why thorough judicial development of the bill of rights
has occurred only at the federal level include the special caliber
of the federal judiciary, a tendency of state courts to rely on de-
cisions construing the federal provisions rather than developing
their own law, and the emphasis placed on federal constitutional
development in the training of lawyers.
4
The Federal Bill of Rights has been elaborated and refined
by the Supreme Court in a continuing process in which litigants
regularly attempt to assert their rights. Although it was origi-
nally interpreted as a restriction solely on the federal govern-
ment, much of it has now been made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.5 The Federal Bill of Rights
also can be distinguished by its relative brevity and lack of de-
nial. These factors may furnish an additional explanation for
the difference in development, for the general language of the
federal guarantees may provide more room for, and indeed
greater necessity for, judicial interpretation. Additionally, liti-
gants often ignore the possibility of bringing an action under a
state constitutional guarantee and base their case solely on the
federal provision.6 And even where both the federal and state
guarantees are raised, the court may choose to discuss the issues
from the standpoint of the federal provisions alone.7
In spite of the prominent role played by the Federal Bill of
Rights, there are a number of reasons why state bills of rights re-
main important. Since state governments have inherent power
in contrast to the federal government which is limited to those
powers specifically delegated to it, there is arguably a greater
need for state constitutions to include restrictions on that power
4. See Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the
Need for a Renaissance, 4 VAr. U. L. Rnv. 125, 128-29 (1969) Mazor,
Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, UTAH L. REv. 326, 348
(1966).
5. See, e.g., Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH.
L. REV. 454, 457-61 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Current Minnesota lawsuits in point are discussed
in notes 91 and 97, infra and accompanying text.
Reasons why attorneys might choose to rely solely upon the federal
provision include avoidance of possible abstention problems and lack
of clarity of the state section. Interview with anonymous attorney, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, April 4, 1973.
7. See Mazor, supra note 4, at 333-34.
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by way of bills of rights. It must also be recognized that state
bills of rights contain certain types of rights not found in the
Federal Constitution which otherwise would not receive protec-
tion.8 Some believe that it is more desirable in a federal system
for the individual to look to the state government for the protec-
tion of his rights,9 and some have advocated careful revision of
state bills of rights to "halt, or at least slow down, the expansion
of federal power."'1  There are others who look upon the fifty
state constitutions as a unique opportunity for experimentation.
While all appear to agree that only fundamental rights should
be included in a constitution, opinions differ on what is funda-
mental, and many commentators believe that as society and tech-
nology change, there must be a periodic inquiry as to whether
there are new rights in need of protection.' State bills of rights
have in fact pioneered in the recognition of certain rights which
have later been read into the Federal Constitution by the Su-
preme Court.'2
There are also reasons why it can be important for state bills
of rights to contain the same rights guaranteed in the Federal
Constitution. Since not all of the rights in the first eight amend-
ments in the Federal Constitution have been applied against the
states, those rights not incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment should be included in the state constitution if there is a de-
sire for such guarantees. Moreover, the interpretation of the
federal rights is not immutable. Perhaps the most significant
factor, however, is that state courts may construe provisions in
the state bill of rights, although identical to federal provisions, as
affording greater protection.
While it is not common for state courts to construe state con-
stitutional provisions in a different manner from their federal
counterparts, some notable examples exist. An early case in
which a state court arrived at a different result was Wynehamer
v. People,13 in which a state prohibition law was held to violate
the state's guarantee of due process in so far as it applied to the
property of those owning liquor at the time of its enactment At
8. See, e.g., Force, supra note 4, at 141-42 (right to bail, prohibi-
tion of imprisonment for debt, guarantee of the legal remedy, etc.)
9. See NATIONAL MIVqICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CoNsTrTToN 27
(6th rev. ed. 1968).
10. Hart, The Bill of Rights: Safeguard of Individual Liberty, 35
TEx. L. REv. 919, 924 (1957).
11. See, e.g., J. WHEELER, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTTruTIONAL Rvi-
SION 19-20 (1961); Countryman, supra note 5, at 456.
12. See, e.g., Mazor, supra note 4, at 345-46.
13. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
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that time this doctrine of substantive due process had not yet
been adopted by the United States Supreme Court; moreover,
state courts continued to invalidate economic legislation on the
basis of their own interpretation of state due process clauses
many years after the doctrine was abandoned at the federal
level.14 In addition, some procedural rights "have been applied
by states to an extent beyond that required . .. by the corre-
sponding federal guarantees."'15 In many states, clauses dealing
with freedom of religion and separation of church and state have
been more restrictively applied.' 0 And in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby,'7 the California Supreme Court went beyond the United
States Supreme Court to declare sex a suspect classification re-
quiring a compelling state interest to justify legislation using it
as a basis for differentiation.' 8
B. TYPES OF PROVISIONS IN STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS
Bills of rights in state constitutions consist in general of
three categories of provisions: sections which may be charac-
terized as statements of political theory, sections which guarantee
substantive rights and sections which provide procedural protec-
tion.19 There is considerable similarity among state bills of
rights because the federal example served widely as a mode 20
and the states borrowed freely from each other. 2' Another ele-
14. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in
the States, 34 MnqN. L. Rzv. 91 (1950); Note, Counterrevolution in State
Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REv. 309 (1963).
15. W. BRENANN, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 20 (1961)
(right against self-incrimination, right to counsel, and protection
against double jeopardy).
16. See generally C. ANTEAU, P. CARROLL, & T. BURKE, RELIGION
UNDER THE STATE CONSTrUTIONS (1965); Mazor, supra note 4, at 333;
Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Free-
doms, 4 VAND. L. REv. 620 (1951); Note, Aid to Parochial Schools-In-
come Tax Credits, 56 MINN. L. REv. 189 (1971).
17. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
18. Cf. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
Similarly, it has been suggested that financing of public schools by
the property tax may be held unconstitutional under state equal pro-
tection clauses despite the recent decision of the Supreme Court holding
such taxation constitutional under the fourteenth amendment. San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S.
Mar. 20, 1973). However, to date the state court cases appear to have
been brought only under the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
19. See, e.g., Greenberg, Civil Liberties, in J. WHEELER, SALIENT
ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 10 (1961).
20. Rankin, The Bill of Rights, in W. GRAVES, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
STATE CONSTITUIONAL REVISION 162 (1960).
21. Much of the Minnesota Constitution, for example, is borrowed
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merit which may have led to greater uniformity is the work of
the National Municipal League and, in particular, the various
editions of its Model State Constitution which especially con-
centrate on procedural guarantees.2 2
While provisions in a bill of rights are generally considered
to be self-executing and therefore enforceable without supple-
mental legislation, they may be treated differently by courts if
the prohibition is directed at private action rather than at state
action. That is, a prohibition will always be self-executing in
its negative effect upon the legislature, which has no power to
enact legislation permitting something constitutionally forbid-
den, but a prohibition against private action may be construed
as requiring legislative implementation for enforcement.2 3 Fur-
ther, the rights may be held not to be self-executing if by their
terms they indicate a necessity for enabling legislation. In such
a case, even if drafted in mandatory form, they cannot be en-
forced if the legislature fails to comply with the mandate.
2 4
However, legislation inconsistent with such provisions will be
nullified by the courts.25
Opinions differ as to whether non-enforceable rights belong
in a state constitution. Some authorities believe that they can
serve a useful symbolic purpose..2 6 Others believe that a "sparse"
document is preferable because the inclusion of "unenforceable
statements of principle" would "merely serve to dilute the man-
datory nature of established... protections."-
2 7
from the Wisconsin Constitution. See W. ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE
CosnuTio OF MnmnSOTA 117 (1921). See also R. DsHMAN, STATE
CONSTrUTIONS: THE SHAPE OF T=E DocuMNT 3-5 (1960).
22. See NATIONAL MuNIcIRAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONsTrrUTION
(6th rev. ed. 1968). The model Bill of Rights contains only seven
sections: one modeled on the first amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution, a due process and equal protection section, a section prohibit-
ing political tests for public office, and four procedural sections relating
to searches and seizures and interceptions, self-incrimination, habeas
corpus, and rights of accused persons.
23. F. GRAD, supra note 2, at 15-17 (Judicial Doctrines on Construc-
tion Affecting Constitutional Revisions). See generally Dodd, Judi-
cially Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PENN. L. REv
54 (1931); Dodd, The Problem of State Constitutional Construction, 20
CoLum. L. REv. 635 (1920).
24. See F. GRAD, supra note 2 at 20 (Some Implications of State
Constitutional Amendment for the Draftsman).
25. Id. at 16-19.
26. See, e.g., R. RAN=I, STATE CoNsvTrUToNs: Biu. oF RiGrrs 19
(1960); A. STuu THE NEED FOR CoNsTrrUTIONAL REmSION IN WEST
VnIGmIA 12 (1950).
27. NATIONAL MUNIUPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTrruTION 27-28
(6th rev. ed. 1968).
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C. RECENT REVISION
General revision of a state constitution is usually accom-
plished through the use of constitutional conventions or special
commissions. Perhaps the most important distinctions between
them are that the convention is composed of elected delegates
while the commission is appointed and that the convention re-
sults in direct submission of its product to the voters whereas
the commission's recommendations must first be approved by
the legislature. In most states, the legislature must initiate the
question of a convention, and the people must generally approve
the holding of a convention and its final product by the majority
of those voting on the proposal. 28 Commission recommendations
must be approved by the legislature and the people according
to the particular provision for amendment in each state. The
legislative approval required for submission to the electorate
usually consists of a special majority of two-thirds or even three-
fifths, while most states require a majority of the popular votes
cast on the provision. 20 In many states, comprehensive revision
by commission is made difficult by restrictions on the number of
amendments which can be submitted to the voters at one time
and by rules which limit the content of amendments to a single
subject. 30
The use of either a convention or a commission may be more
advantageous depending on the circumstances. The constitu-
tional convention provides an opportunity to study the adequacy
of the constitution as a whole and to present an entire document
to the voters. But legislators have traditionally been suspicious
of the convention method which bypasses the legislature, and
critics claim that it has not been as ideal in form as in theory.3 '
28. See F. GRAD, supra note 2, at 22-23 (Some Implications of State
Constitutional Amendment for the Draftsman). Variance in the popu-
lar vote requirement appears to be a crucial factor in the success of
amendments; the requirement of a majority of all votes cast in the
election is more difficult to meet. The relative influence on successful
amendment proposals may be seen by the Minnesota experience where
a 72% passage ratio declined to 32.5% when the state shifted to the lat-
ter requirement.
29. F. GRAD, supra note 2, at 19 (Some Implications of State Con-
stitutional Amendment for the Draftsman).
30. Id. at 20, 26-27. Nevertheless, the number of amendments
added to state constitutions presents a striking contrast to the number
added to the Federal Constitution. For example, in Louisiana there
have been 460, in California 350, and over 90 in Minnesota. 2 H. GIM-
LIN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORIv EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 705
(1968).
31. See, e.g., Adrian, Trends in State Constitutions, 5 HARV. J.
Lnois. 311, 322 (1968).
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In the 10 states having constitutional conventions since 1966,
the voters approved only four of the new constitutions. 2 Study
commissions on the other hand have frequently been dominated
by legislators and have had an even lower ratio of voter accep-
tance until recently.33 In the last few years commissions have
been used in several ways. They have been increasingly em-
ployed to prepare a comprehensive plan for constitutional revi-
sion by a methodical program of section-by-section submission to
the electorate; and they have been especially effective in achiev-
ing change by adopting so-called gateway amendments which
may ease the vote requirement for passage and permit revision
of a whole article at one time.3 4
State constitutional revision has historically occurred in
waves. One analyst has identified at least four periods of wide-
spread revision:35 the period after the Civil War when pro-
visions relating to that struggle were introduced into state con-
stitutions, e.g., extension of the suffrage to blacks in some states;
the late nineteenth century when the populist distrust of officials
led to constitutional restriction on judicial terms and provisions
for a longer ballot and for the initiative and referendum; the
first two decades of the twentieth century in which there was an
interest in increasing executive powers; and the period of the
last 10 years. The current revision "wave" is said to have
been initiated by the 1964 decision in Reynolds v. SimsOG requir-
ing reapportionment of state legislatures and thus eliminating
the main obstacle to winning legislative support for the calling
of a constitutional convention.3 7 Within three years of the de-
cision, twenty-two states had initiated some form of constitu-
tional revision,38 and many others have since followed.39
32. See MINmESOTA CONSTrrTI oNAL STUDY CoMIIssIox, FNAL RE-
roRT 9 (1973).
33. One critic indicates that in the 25 year period before 1968
only one constitution produced by a commission was approved by the
voters, even though there had been sixty commission active in some
thirty states. See H. GiLI, supra. note 30, at 709. See also MINN-
soTA CoNsTITToNAL STUDY Co1VissSiox, FINAL REPORT 11 (1973).
34. California and Pennsylvania have used this method. See
CouNcIL OF STATE GoVEwNivExTs, RcNT CoNsTTUTONAL REvisioN Ac-
TrfVrIEs 1967-1968, at 3 (1969); Sumner, Constitutional Revision by Com-
mission in California, STATE GOV'T 135-38 (Spring, 1972).
35. Adrian, supra note 31, at 313-19.
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. See Adrian, supra note 31, at 319.
38. Id. at 320.
39. See CouNcn. OF STATE GovERNMENTs, THE BooK or THE STATES,
1970-71 (1970); CouNciL or STATE GOVERNmiVENTS, TuE BooK OF TaE
STATES 1972-73 (1972).
1973]
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Despite the recognition during the sixties that new solutions
must be found for many social and civil rights problems, there
appeared to be greater interest in so-called "efficiency and econ-
omy" constitutional change than in the bill of rights. Probably
the most important generating forces behind the revision efforts
have been constitutional restrictions on governmental organiza-
tion and financing, such as limitations on the executive or on
taxation or debt powers.40 The need to reapportion has also been
a significant motive. No state appears to have instituted consti-
tutional revision because of an apparent urgent need for change
in the bill of rights.
Nevertheless, the work of the conventions and commissions
reflects a continuing interest in reviewing the bill of rights and
suggests that certain types of rights are gaining support for in-
clusion in state constitutions. It is also noteworthy that recent
amendments proposed in the bill of rights area have had a higher
ratio of successful passage than proposals in any other area.4"
While the most common interest appears to be in constitutional
provisions barring discrimination, 42 special interest has also been
shown in providing greater protection against wiretapping and
eavesdropping devices, 43 in adding right to bear arms sections, 44
in guaranteeing the right to organize,45 in protecting the individ-
ual dealing with administrative agencies, 46 in assuring the rights
of the fetus or alternatively of the prospective mother desiring
an abortion,4 7 and in protecting the handicapped. 48  There have
also been demands to add guarantees relating to the protection
of the environment.4 9
40. See A. STURM, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN MICHIGAN, 1961-1962,
at 155 (1963); Adrian, supra note 31, at 320.
41. See A. STURMr, TRENDS IN STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING 1966-
1970, at 16a (1971).
42. See, e.g., R. RANKIN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: BILL OF RIGHTS, 8-9
(1960). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 105-116 infra.
43. See Graves, State Constitutional Law: A Twenty-five Year
Summary, 8 Wm. & MiARY L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1966); Morris, New Horizons
for a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L. REv. 474, 478-80 (1970).
44. See discussion in text accompanying notes 150-55 infra.
45. See, e.g., Graves, supra note 43, at 18; Rankin, The Bill of
Rights, in W. GRAVES, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
166-67 (1960).
46. See R. RANKIN, STATE CONsTrUTONS: BILL OF RIGHTS 10-11
(1960); Sturm, Bills of Rights in New State Constitutions, in C. BECK,
LAW AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT S. RANKIN 176-77 (1970).
47. See discussion in text accompanying notes 187-88 infra. See
also MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, BILL OF RIGHTS COM-
MITTEE REPORT 22 (1973).
48. See discussion in text accompanying note 114 infra.
49. See discussion in text accompanying note 68 infra.
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III. THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL
STUDY COMMISSION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. BACKGROUND
While the Minnesota Constitution provides for constitutional
change by convention or by amendment, change in Minnesota
has traditionally occurred through the amendment process. The
only constitutional convention in the state's history was held in
1857 to draft the original constitution.5 0 While the required ma-
jority in the legislature necessary to put an amendment on the
ballot is a simple majority, a two-thirds vote is required for a
constitutional convention.51 The popular majority needed to pass
an amendment is a majority of those voting in the election rather
than a majority of those voting on the particular provision, -
while the document produced by a convention must receive a
three-fifths vote of approval 5 3 Dissatisfaction with the piece-
meal amendment process prompted the legislature to create a
Minnesota Constitutional Commission in 1948 which recom-
mended extensive changes and the calling of a constitutional con-
vention.54 Although no convention was called by the legislature,
many of the commission's recommendations were subsequently
adopted as amendments, including provisions for simultaneous
terms for the constitutional officers, reorganization of the judi-
ciary, and home-rule.55
A constitutional convention was once again suggested by the
Governor of Minnesota in a special message to the legislature in
March, 1971, in which he mentioned four areas where he con-
sidered reform to be "especially critical": methods to make the
legislature more effective such as flexible annual sessions and
party designation; changes to allow flexibility in tax policy; en-
vironmental protection; and review of the appropriateness of
dedicating constitutional funds to certain purposes such as the
highway trust fund.56 Governor Anderson favored a convention
50. It actually consisted of two separate conventions since the Re-
publicans and Democrats refused to meet together. See generally W.
ANDERsoN, A HISTORY OF THE CoNSTITUIoN OF MINNESOTA (1921).
51. MVin. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1-2.
52. Id., § 1.
53. Id., § 3.
54. See MhmOTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY COMMnSSION, FINAL RE-
PORT 5 (1973).
55. See Mitau, Constitutional Change by Amendment: Recommen-
dations of the Minnesota Constitutional Commission in Ten Year's Per-
spective, 44 MmN. L. REv. 461 (1960).
56. See MN-EsOTA CONSTrruTiONAL STUDY CoMMIsSION, FInAL RE-
PoRT 6 (1973).
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because of its possibilities for citizen input and prompter action.
However, he also proposed that a commission be created to initi-
ate the study. The legislature chose to follow only the second
suggestion.
The Minnesota Constitutional Study Commission, authorized
by the 1971 session of the legislature,5 7 was organized in October
of 1971. Its membership consisted of six members of the House
of Representatives appointed by the Speaker, 8 six senators ap-
pointed by the Senate Committee on Committees, 0 one person
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 0 and eight
persons appointed by the Governor.0 ' The scope of the commis-
sion's task as outlined by the legislature was to:
study the Minnesota Constitution, other revised state constitu-
tions and studies and documents relating to constitutional re-
vision, and propose such constitutional revisions and a revised
format for a new Minnesota constitution as may appear neces-
sary, in preparation for a constitutional convention if called or
a basis for making further amendments to the present consti-
tution.
It was also to "consider the constitution in relation to political,
economic and social changes.
062
While the commission met in plenary session at least monthly
until the completion of its work in December of 1972, the bulk of
the work was done by small committees. 8 The commission de-
cided at an early meeting to rely on its own membership to form
57. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 806, § 3.
58. Aubrey W. Dirlam, Richard W. Fitzsimons, O.J. Heinitz, L.J.
Lee (resigned from the legislature and therefore from the commission
in the fall of 1972 when he was appointed to the Board of Regents of
the University of Minnesota), Ernest A. Lindstrom, Joseph Prifrel.
(Included were the speaker and majority leader of the 1971 session.)
59. Robert J. Brown, Jack Davies, Carl A. Jensen, Robert J. Ten-
nessen, Stanley N. Thorup, Kenneth Wolfe.
60. James C. Otis, Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
61. Chairman Elmer L. Andersen, and Carl A. Auerbach, Orville
J. Evenson, Joyce A. Hughes, Betty Kane, Diana E. Murphy, Karl F.
Rolvaag, Duane C. Scribner. (The group consisted of two former gov-
ernors, two law professors, a union official, a past state chairwoman of
one of the political parties, an administrative official at the University
of Minnesota, and a past president of the Minneapolis League of
Women Voters.)
62. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 806, § 3(2).
63. There were ten committees charged with studying particular
areas of the Minnesota Constitution: Amendment Process, Bill of
Rights, Intergovernmental Relations and Local Government, Judicial
Branch, Legislative Branch, Education, Executive Branch, Finance,
Natural Resources, and Transportation. In addition there were a Steer-
ing Committee, a Final Report Committee, and a Structure and Form
Committee.
[Vol. 58:157/
MINNESOTA BILL OF RIGHTS
the committees. Although this decision limited the variety of
viewpoints that could be represented, the commission chairman
believed that the exclusive use of commission members made or-
ganization less cumbersome and avoided delay, and he was also
impressed by the apparent willingness of the commission to
tackle the job itself.64 The priorities at the outset of the com-
mission's work may have been evidenced by the fact that the
larger committees were those entrusted with the issues of legis-
lative reform and reapportionment, restrictions on state financ-
ing, and organization and selection of the judiciary.0 5
Although the 1948 Constitutional Commission had no sepa-
rate committee to investigate the bill of rights area, 0 the chair-
man of the 1972 commission selected this as one of the 10 sub-
stantive areas for concentration. He may have been partly in-
fluenced by expressions of public interest in the bill of rights
and by a letter from one member of the commission urging that
such a committee be created, 7 but it also appears that personally
he believed environmental rights should be protected in state
constitutions.6 However, he never indicated at the time that
he believed this issue should be considered by the Bill of Rights
Committee, which voluntarily deferred the matter to the Natural
Resources Committee partly because of the number of complex
issues already facing it.
B. PROCEDURE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ConmITTE
The Bill of Rights Committee, which consisted of three mem-
bers responsible for studying the first article of the Minnesota
Constitution, 69 operated in a manner similar to that of the other
64. Interview with Elmer L. Andersen, Chairman of the Minnesota
Constitutional Study. Commission, in St. Paul, Minnesota, March 6,
1973.
65. The Legislative Branch and Finance Committees each had five
members while the Judicial Branch and Transportation Committees had
four members. The other study committees each had only three mem-
bers, the minimum number of commissioners required by the enabling
legislation. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 806, § 3(3).
66. See REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMrISSION OF MINNESOTA
101-04 (1948).
67. This commissioner was subsequently appointed chairman of
the committee.
68. Interview with Elmer L. Andersen, Chairman of the Minne-
sota Constitutional Study Commission in St. Paul, Minnesota, March
6, 1973. The chairman indicated that he believed it was important to
designate a special committee to reaffirm the importance of the Bill
of Rights in a time of social, as well as economic and technological,
change.
69. Chairman Diana E. Murphy, Senator Robert J. Brown, and
1973] --
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
committees of the commission. All were hampered by lack of
staff,7 0 which limited the availability of research and drafting
assistance. As a result the scope of the committee studies was
largely dependent upon efforts of individual members and input
from the public.
Unlike the practice in some states, particularly those using
a constitutional convention approach, no special studies were pre-
pared to serve as a foundation for commission study. 71 Instead
the work was initiated by a letter requesting suggestions for de-
letions, additions, and revision of the Minnesota Constitution.
This letter was sent to all department heads of state government,
to former state officials and other individuals known to be inter-
ested in constitutional change, to registered lobbyists, and to a
long list of organizations including political parties, civic and pro-
fessional groups, and those working for minority rights and social
change. Although the response was not overwhelming, the re-
plies received aided the various committees in deciding on issues
and approaches. The Bill of Rights Committee proceeded to
schedule a series of public hearings. On the basis of the re-
sponses to the commission's letter, the committee selected the
two areas, discrimination against and the rights of those con-
fined in state prisons and mental institutions, in which public
interest seemed to be the greatest for discussion at the first hear-
Representative L.J. Lee. The committee was also responsible for study-
ing the Elective Franchise article. Its recommendations for change
in this article were almost entirely adopted by the commission. See
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 24-25(1973).
70. The legislative appropriation was only $25,000. This was spent
on staff salaries, office and printing expenses, and transportation. The
only full-time employee was a secretary, but a summer assistant was
also hired to work on publicity and reports. In addition Professor
Fred Morrison of the University of Minnesota Law School, Research
Director for the commission, received a salary for one month in which
he devoted full time to certain of the committee reports.
While an arrangement with the University of Minnesota Law
School provided that nine students prepare constitutional research pa-
pers for credit, the fact remained that the commission did not have the
kind of expert assistance available to assure an in-depth study of the
scope outlined by the legislature. Nevertheless, in addition to the final
report of the commission, an individual committee report was submitted
in each area discussing the issues and eventual recommendations.
Most study commissions operative in other states have received a
larger appropriation. The California commission has received almost
three million dollars during the eight years in which it has worked.
Commissions of a term of two years or less in Alabama, Arkansas, and
Louisiana have received $100,000. MINNE soTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY
COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 41-42 (1973).
71. An example which the committee found to be particularly
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ing.72 Further hearings were held to take testimony on any sub-
ject related to the bill of rights.7 3
During the hearings the committee received testimony from
forty-five individuals, the majority of whom were spokesmen
for organizations and thus presumably representative of other
persons with similar views.74 A number of government officials
also testified.' 5 Communications other than at the hearings were
received in the form of memoranda, letters and telephone calls.
This information together with the results of the committee
members' own research efforts, plus some supplementary aids,
provided the foundation for the committee's discussion, delibera-
tion, and eventual recommendations.
The committee adopted an informal decisional procedure.
Following the completion of the public hearings and the gather-
ing of other information, the committee met to discuss all of the
proposals submitted. After a vote was taken on whether to rec-
ommend constitutional change in each area, the chairman was
authorized to draft proposed language where necessary for those
areas receiving majority approval The draft language was then
submitted to the committee. When finally satisfactory to the
committee, the proposals were incorporated into the committee
report written by the chairman and sent to the Revisor of Stat-
utes for his comments.
helpful is G. BRADEN & R. Com r, THE ILLINois CoNsTrroN: AN ANNo-
TANTED AND ComimAnAvE ANALYsis (1969). A special bibliography on state
constitutional revision was prepared for the commission, however, by
the legislative reference library.
72. The first hearing took place at the State Capitol in St. Paul
on April 6.
73. A second hearing was held on the campus of Moorhead State
College on May 4, and a final all-day hearing at the Capitol on June 21
completed the formal taking of testimony.
74. The organizations included the Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union, the Mental Health Association of Minnesota, the National Or-
ganization of Women, Minnesota Women's Political Caucus, State
League of Human Rights Commissions, the Women's Equity Action
League, the Committee for Effective Crime Control, the Minneapolis
Urban Coalition Action Council. United Cerebral Palsy, the United
Blind of Minnesota, Epilepsy League of Minnesota, Minnesota Citizens
Concerned for Life, and the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group.
MINNESOTA CONSTrTUMONAL STUDY CoMMIssIoN, BILL OF RIGHTS COM-
MnTEE REPORT 25-27 (1973).
75. Among the officials who testified before the committee were
the Department of Corrections Commissioner, the Director of Education
and Manpower Development in the Department of Public Welfare, the
United States Congressman from the fifth district, a representative of
the State Department of Human Rights, and the University of Minne-
sota Equal Opportunities Compliance Officer.
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While the committee concentrated most of its attention on
proposals for additions to the bill of rights, it also sought to as-
certain whether the present article would be improved by revi-
sion or deletion of any of its sections. Since there existed no
critical analysis of the Minnesota Bill of Rights like that prepared
for constitutional revision efforts in some states, and since al-
most no dissatisfaction with present provisions was expressed by
the public, the committee was dependent on its own survey and
that of the 1948 Constitutional Commission in determining the
need for change.7 6 In contrast to the other committees which
were inclined to concentrate upon several matters, the Bill of
Rights Committee attempted to consider a great number of issues
with the result that there was less opportunity to investigate the
ramifications of each proposal. Although the committee singled
out the rights of women and those in state institutions and the
right to privacy as being perhaps most in need of additional con-
stitutional protection, it also attempted to fully consider pro-
posals in other areas of concern.
Ultimately the committee recommendations were presented
to the full commission on September 20, 1972. Before action
could be taken on most of them, the commission voted to adjourn
until after the November election when it became apparent that
many of the legislators on the commission were feeling pressured
by the need to devote their time to campaigning instead of com-
mission deliberations. 77 The committee decided to modify its
proposals before the next commission meeting. On the basis of
its analysis of the commission's reactions to its recommendations,
the committee felt that there was little chance that they would
be accepted in their original form. The revised recommendations
were, on the whole, adopted with very little discussion or dissen-
sion at the November meeting.7 8
C. REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS COMMITTEE
The Bill of Rights Committee recommendations were based
on its study of the Minnesota Bill of Rights,7 9 as well as on its
analysis of proposals submitted to it and provisions found in
other constitutions. The present Minnesota Bill of Rights, con-
76. See REPORT OF THE CoNsTrUnoTNAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA
16-20 (1948).
77. Interview with Diana E. Murphy, Chairman of the Bill of
Rights Committee, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, January 10, 1973.
78. See discussion in text accompanying notes 197-208 infra.
79. MINN. CONST. art. I.
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sisting of eighteen sections, provides affirmative protection for
liberty of the press, the right of trial by jury, the rights of the
accused in criminal proceedings, and the right of habeas corpus.
Other sections forbid excessive bail, unreasonable punishments,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
There are also provisions ensuring just compensation for the tak-
ing of private property for public use and freedom of religion
as well as sections on treason, land tenure, the military as sub-
ordinate to the civil power, and the farmer's right to sell with-
out a license. Perhaps the section receiving the most attention
from the committee was section 2 which has been construed as
a due process and equal protection guarantee although worded
in an archaic and unfamiliar manner.8 0
As a result of its study the committee decided to recommend
that six sections be added to the Minnesota Bill of Rights, that
two sections be deleted, that one be moved to another article,
and that one be modified. The sections to be added relate to the
rights of the mentally disabled, the equality of rights, the right
to know, the right of assembly and the right to bear arms.
1. Rights of the Mentally Disabled
Persons suffering from mental illness or mental retardation
have not usually been singled out for specific constitutional
treatment by the states. While Texas has a section in the bill of
rights relating to commitment procedures,8 ' most states have
chosen to set out such safeguards in statutes. Such statutes
often contain detailed provisions concerning release, voting
rights, or the right to contract. Constitutional protection has
been invoked for the mentally disabled under the due process
clauses of the federal and state constitutions and through the
right to habeas corpus guaranteed in many constitutions.
New developments in this area of the law were reflected in
80. Id., § 2:
Rights and Privileges.
No member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of
any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof,
unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in
the State otherwise than the punishment of crime, whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.
81. TEx. CONsT. art. 1, § 15. In 1935 an amendment was added to
the right of trial by jury section: "Provided that the Legislature may
provide for the temporary commitment, for observation and/or treat-
ment, of mentally ill persons not charged with a criminal offense, for a
period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days, by order of the County
Court without the necessity of a trial by jury."
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testimony to the committee. Questions of due process 8 2 have
most frequently been raised in regard to commitment procedures,
but since 1966 and the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in
Rouse v. Cameron,83 some courts have recognized a constitu-
tional right to treatment. The right to treatment doctrine posits
that involuntary commitment to a state mental hospital cannot
be justified constitutionally unless the individual receives treat-
ment for his illness. Under the doctrine the individual may ob-
tain his release by habeas corpus if only custodial care is offered
or the treatment is found inadequate.8 4 It may also be possible
to sue the government for damages or use mandamus to force
treatment.8 5 Although the doctrine has been criticized on the
ground that adequate treatment is not a workable standard,80
some courts are adopting what they consider to be enforceable
guidelines.
Recently the doctrine has been extended to cover the men-
tally retarded. Recognizing that medical science no longer con-
siders the level of retardation to be permanently fixed, a federal
district court ruled in Wyatt v. Stickney8 that there is a consti-
tutional right to habilitation, treatment geared to raise the level
of the individual's "physical, mental, and social efficiency."88
Local concern about the right to treatment came to the
committee's attention through the hearings and through media
reports of law suits. Testimony from the representative of the
State Department of Public Welfare stressed such areas of con-
cern as admission, in-hospital practices and privacy. 9 The di-
rector of the Occupational Training Center, IncY0 urged the com-
mittee to review the adequacy of the language of section 2 of the
82. See generally R. FARMER, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL
(1967); SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
AND THE LAW RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS OF THE AssocIATIoN OF THE BAn
OF NEW YoRK, IENTAL ILLNESS DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DE-
FENDANT (1968); Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill
before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1969-70).
83. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
84. Id. at 458-59.
85. See Comment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 898, 902-03 (1967).
86. See Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134
(1967); Comment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 898, 900-01 (1967).
87. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
88. Id. at 395-407.
89. Statement of Miriam Karlins, Director of Education and Man-
power Development, Department of Public Welfare, to the Minnesota
Constitutional Study Commission, at the hearing on April 6, 1972.
90. John Du Rand, statement to the Bill of Rights Committee, at
the hearing on June 21, 1972.
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Minnesota Bill of Rights in light of the decision in Wyatt. The
committee also took notice of a lawsuit brought in the Federal
District Court of Minnesota seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief on the ground that the state hospitals for the retarded do
not meet constitutionally minimal standards of adequate habili-
tation.91
Other concerns were also expressed in the area of mental
illness. Despite the passage in Minnesota of the Hospitalization-
Commitment Act 92 in 1967 giving increased protection to persons
suffering from mental illness, there is evidence that the rights
of such persons are still being violated. In disregard of the pro-
cedure mandated by the Act, it appears that "many patients have
not been afforded a full and fair commitment hearing."9 3 Fur-
ther, some believe that the Act did not go far enough: that per-
sons committed to mental hospitals should have the same right
to immediate counsel, bail, and access to the telephone as do
those charged with committing a crime; 94 that while the Act is
concerned only with admission and retention procedures, the
rights of patients during their hospitalization must also be safe-
guarded; that the use of drug therapy, electroshock and lobot-
omy present special problems in regard to the rights of the in-
dividual that have not been adequately dealt with;9 5 and that the
Act does not provide adequate protection of rights upon dis-
charge.9 6 The committee also took note of the fact that a class
action suit97 had been brought in the federal district court seek-
ing to have parts of the 1967 Act declared unconstitutional be-
cause it provides that a patient's discharge may be revoked with-
out notice or an opportunity to be heard.
While the committee believed that many of the problems
91. Welch v. Likins, Civil No. 472-451 (D. Minn., Filed Aug. 30,
1972). The suit has been brought by the Legal Aid Society of Minnea-
polis on behalf of six patients in state hospitals and as a class action
on behalf of all mentally retarded patients in these institutions; it is
presently in the discovery stage.
92. inm. STAT. § 253A (1973).
93. Haydock & Orey, Involuntary Commitment in Minnesota,
B cNm AND BAR OF MnqmSOTA, March, 1972, at 23.
94. Statement of Miriam Karlins, supra note 89. See generally
R. FARME, THE iGarrs oF E MEmRALLY ILL 89-91 (1967).
95. Statement of Miriam Karlins, supra note 89. See generally
Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Il, supra note 82, at 11.
96. Statement of Miriam Karlins, supra note 89; see Haydock &
Orey, Involuntary Commitment in Minnesota, supra note 93.
97. Anderson v. Likins, Civil No. 472-422 (D. Minn., Filed Aug.
10, 1972). The suit was brought by Ramsey County Legal Assistance
and is still pending. Interview with Dolores Orey, Ramsey County
Legal Assistance, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, April 4,1973.
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outlined before it could be handled by legislation, it felt that the
actual and potential abuses in this area were of a nature so
closely associated with fundamental human rights that a spe-
cific guarantee in the constitution was warranted. However, the
committee hoped to avoid creating problems by employing overly
specific language. It also chose not to mention in the constitu-
tion itself the right to treatment because of the complex issues
which it raises, particularly in view of limited state funds.
In drafting the provision the committee relied heavily upon
proposals submitted by the State Department of Public Welfare.
Although the department had suggested an amendment to sec-
tion 298 to include specifically "those citizens alleged to be men-
tally disabled or impaired," the committee preferred to pro-
pose a guarantee of the rights of the mentally disabled in a sep-
arate section to be added to the bill of rights. By use of a sep-
arate section, the committee hoped to emphasize the guarantee,
which incorporated the language of the present section 2 to
read:
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED: No person shall be
disenfranchised or deprived of his rights or restrained in his
physical person on the basis of mental disability or impairment
unless by the law of the land or judgment of his peers.9D
Because the committee was particularly concerned about the
dangers inherent in some of the types of treatment in institu-
tions for the mentally ill or retarded, it wished to assure that
procedures would be followed which would protect the rights of
those treated. Under the present Minnesota statute, such re-
quirements are set out only in relation to surgery. °0 0 Even in
this case, the head of the hospital may order surgery only if the
relatives or guardian cannot be found and the hospital official
deems the patient incompetent to judge for himself. In order to
assure adequate protection for the patient not only in the sur-
gery situation but also in the administration of drug therapy
and electroshock, the committee offered an additional new sec-
tion:
INVIOLABILITY OF THE BODY: No person shall be com-
pelled to undergo procedures involving surgery, convulsive elec-
troshock, confinement of person or bodily movements, or any
procedure causing irreversible physiological effects unless in-
formed consent of the person or his guardian is given or unless
98. I-iNw. CONST. art. I, § 2; see note 80 supra.
99. INNESOTA CoNsTrruToNAL STUDY COMvISSION, BiL oF RI(oirrs
CommrV'TEn REPORT 14 (1973).
100. MINN. STAT. § 253A.17(8) (1973).
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appropriate procedures have been followed to obtain legal ap-
proval for their application in such instances.' 0
This proposal was identical in form to the Department of
Public Welfare suggestion. Inclusion of the term "convulsive
electroshock" was suggested by the department. However, the
terms could be interpreted as a more restricted category of treat-
ment than the committee intended. The treatment aimed at is
the therapeutic administration of electricity, gas, or drugs which
may not involve actual shock but which causes a convulsion.
Some medical experts criticized the proposal because they be-
lieved that it implied that "convulsive electroshock" necessarily
caused "irreversible physiological effects,"1 ° - but the phrase
"any procedure causing irreversible physiological effects" was
intended as a separate category, rather than as a general term
inclusive of the other examples listed.
The committee considered incorporating the provision on
"Inviolability of the Body" into the section on "Rights of the
Mentally Disabled" but decided to give it an independent valid-
ity so that it might be used to prevent such procedures as forced
sterilization of others in the general populace. For example, the
provision is intended to prevent the state from ordering sterili-
zation of all those with two or more children.
2. Equality of Rights
The most common constitutional guarantee that relates to
equality of rights is the guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. It is found in some 21 state constitutions, 0 3 as well as in
the Model State Constitution'04 and the Federal Constitution.
An additional type of equal rights provision found in some state
bills of rights requires that individuals shall be free from dis-
crimination or interference with their civil rights. Such provi-
sions are normally combined with an equal protection clause as
in the Michigan guarantee that:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws;
nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or
political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof
101. MnN EsoTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY CoImIssIoN, BiLL OF RiGHTs
CoAnnE REPORT 15 (1973).
102. Interview with Richard Gibson, a Minneapolis Star reporter
who had access to the written reactions of medical personnel in the
state hospitals to the committee's proposal, in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
March 16, 1973.
103. Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the
Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. Ryv. 125, 177 (1969).
104. MoDEL. STrT CONST. art. I, § 1.02.
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because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legisla-
ture shall implement this section by appropriate legislation.'or
Whether such a clause has any independent efficacy is a matter
of debate. The judicial construction accorded an early example
in New York is used as an illustration by some who question
such efficacy. There a provision guaranteeing that "[n] o person
shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency
or subdivision of the state"'' 0 was interpreted as creating no civil
rights apart from those already existing in the constitution or
statutes. Thus, attempts to hold discrimination against blacks in
housing illegal under the section were unsuccessful. 0 7 Never-
theless, there appears to be a trend towards inclusion of such a
provision in state bills of rights. The Model State Constitution,
which is based on the concept of including only enforceable
rights, has included a civil rights provision not because it is
"essential" but "because of current and continuing interest in the
subject."' 0 8 Among the new constitutions in which a civil rights
guarantee appears are Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, New
Jersey, and Puerto Rico.'0 9 The Illinois provision which applies
to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, ancestry, and sex
in employment and housing, is especially interesting in that it
explicitly assures that the rights shall be enforceable without
legislation." 0
While those constitutions which contain protection for spec-
105. MIcH. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
106. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
107. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541,
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1949) (blacks seeking apartments in housing
project); Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680, aff'd, 273 App.
Div. 789, 75 N.Y.S.2d 768, rev'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d
325 (1947) (restrictive covenant).
108. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 30 (6th
rev. ed. 1968).
109. ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 17; MONT. CoNsT. art. III, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5; P.R.
CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
110. ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 17:
No Discrimination in Employment and the Sale or Rental of
Property.
All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and
sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer or
in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the General
Assembly, but the General Assembly by law may establish
reasonable exemptions relating to these rights and provide ad-
ditional remedies for their violation.
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ified classes of people have traditionally included the categories
of race, religion, and ancestry, there is a growing tendency to
include others. Sex has been recognized as a forbidden basis of
discrimination in a number of state bills of rights."1  Gener-
ally this has been done in the framework of an equal protection
provision so that the guarantee is limited by the traditional
equal protection doctrine which has not recognized sex as a sus-
pect classification.11 2 However, in those states such as Pennsyl-
vania which have adopted an equal rights amendment similar to
that proposed by Congress, "reasonable" discrimination on the
basis of sex can no longer be upheld." 3 Another group for
which specific constitutional protection has been advocated is
the physically and mentally handicapped. At present, the only
explicit mention of the handicapped appears in the new Illinois
Bill of Rights, which has a section barring discrimination against
the handicapped in the sale or rental of property, and in em-
ployment in so far as it is "unrelated to ability."" 4 Several con-
stitutions also bar discrimination on account of "social origin or
condition' 1 5 although generally-stated economic or social rights
provisions are thought by many to be currently unenforce-
able.116
Although the Minnesota Bill of Rights Committee quickly
agreed that some kind of guarantee of equal rights should be
added to the constitution, it found it difficult to agree on either
the contents or the wording of such a section. Even though
section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution has served the general
purpose of an equal protection clause, it does not declare the pol-
icy of the state in a clear and understandable manner. 11 Fur-
111. See, e.g., HAwAm CoNsT. art. I, § 4; ILxt CONST. art. I, § 17;
MoAT. CONST. art. IL § 4; P.R. CoxsT. art. fl § 1.
112. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Brown, Emerson,
Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 875-82 (1971).
113. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 112, at
884-85. The language of the Pennslyvania amendment reads as follows:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the
individual.
PENN. CoxsT. art. I, § 27.
114. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 19:
No Discrimination Against the Handicapped.
All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be free
from discrimination in the sale or rental of property and
shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the
hiring and promotion practices of any employer.
115. MoNT. CoNsT. art. I, § 3; P.R. CONsT. art. II § 1.
116. See, e.g., MODEL STATE CONsTrrU oN, supra note 108, at 27-28.
117. See note 80 supra.
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thermore, the committee wished to provide greater protection
than that which is available under the equal protection clause. It
wished to formulate a basic principle that would not necessarily
be limited to state action but could also apply to private dis-
crimination. It also wished to provide an adequate guarantee
of rights for several groups for whom equal protection doctrines
had provided uncertain protection. At the same time it wanted
to keep the constitution free of unnecessary detail and to avoid
rigidity.
In addition to a guarantee of the rights of racial minorities,
persons with varying religious beliefs, and aliens, the committee
was convinced by voluminous testimony in the course of the
public hearings that the rights of women and the handicapped
should be recognized in the constitutional provision. More per-
sons testified about the rights of women than about any other
issue." 8 Although these persons favored a separate equal rights
amendment to the Minnesota Constitution similar to the pro-
posed federal amendment'" and the recent addition to the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, 20 only the chairman of the committee sup-
ported this approach. The other members preferred the concept
of a single general section dealing with the whole area of equal-
ity of rights.
Drafting presented complex problems. The proposal origi-
nally favored by the committee, 12' based largely on a provision
in the Puerto Rico Constitution, was criticized as being unen-
forceable. The problem lay in its similarity to the New York
civil rights provision which has been consistently construed as
creating no rights not embodied elsewhere in the constitution or
statutes. 122 However, the New York decisions construing the sec-
tion were based largely on statements of the drafters that the
section could have no effect without legislative implementa-
118. MNESOTA CoNsTmrnTIoNAL STUDY CoMMISSION, BILL OF RIGHTS
COMITTEE REPORT 17 (1973).
119. IHR.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REc. 4612
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972).
120. See note 113 supra.
121. The proposal was submitted by the Action Council of the Ur-
ban Coalition of Minneapolis:
No person may be denied the enjoyment of his or her civil
right or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because
of race, color, creed religion, sex, ancestry, birth, social origin
or condition, or political or religious ideas.
Statement of Franklin J. Knoll, Executive Director of the Minneapolis
Urban Coalition Action Council, to the Bill of Rights Committee at the
hearing on June 21, 1973.
122. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
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tion.123 It is therefore possible that a different result would ob-
tain where it was clear that the section was intended to create
enforceable rights.
While the committee preferred to create a self-executing
section, such an approach involved many difficulties, particu-
larly because the committee wished to reach private discrimina-
tion. Civil rights statutes such as Minnesota's 1 24 normally con-
tain a number of exceptions to their coverage. Political consid-
erations may necessitate such exceptions to ensure passage of
civil rights legislation. In similar fashion, a committee draft
barring private discrimination immediately encountered objec-
tions from legislators who raised the spectacle of forcing the
YWCA to admit male boarders. The inclusion of the handi-
capped in the section compounded the problem, for all recog-
nized that inability to perform in a particular job is a bona fide
reason for employment rejection. -1 2 5 Since the committee wished
to avoid adding statutory detail to the constitution, it was un-
willing to try to incorporate exceptions into a broad self-execut-
ing section. As a result, the committee drafted a self-executing
equal protection clause to apply to state action and in addition,
included language which the committee hoped would declare a
more general policy, mandatory on the legislature:
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: Neither the state nor any of its in-
strumentalities shall deny any person the equal protection of
the law. The Legislature shall provide by law for the protection
of persons against discrimination in the provision of housing,
education, employment, public accommodations, public facilities
123. See Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 314, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680, 685,
a'ffd, 273 App. Div. 789, 75 N.Y.S.2d 768, rev'd on other grounds, 298
N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d 325 (1947).
124. MInN. STAT. § 363 (1973).
125. The Office of the Revisor of Statutes was particularly concerned
about the inclusion of the handicapped in the section:
Of course a person may be unfit for a particular job because
of a physical or mental handicap. Discrimination because of
that unfitness cannot be the kind of discrimination that the sec-
tion is intended to reach. The present language of the section
will force courts to invent some new term to describe discrimi-
nation because of physical or mental unfitness and is an invi-
tation to litigation about elementary matters. Less important
but similar questions might be raised about the reference to
creed, religion and sex. Perhaps some or all of these could be
resolved by a reference to fitness for employment. I realize
that the practice with discrimination law has been to use cate-
gorical language and rely on the courts to develop exceptions.
Nevertheless, this process has the air of '"passing the bucl',
and the Committee might consider whether it can do better.
Letter from Harry M. Walsh, Acting Assistant Revisor of Statutes, to
Diana Murphy, September 18, 1972, on file Minnesota Law Review.
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and services on account of race, color, creed, religion, sex, na-
tional or social origin, or physical or mental handicap.120
The committee hoped to attain several ends with this lan-
guage. In adding such categories as sex, physical or mental
handicap, and social origin, the committee realized that it was
going beyond the constitutions of most other states, but it be-
lieved that these categories represented persons who had suffered
undue discrimination of a nature calling for a basic guarantee of
their rights by the state. It hoped that the listing of protected
categories in the second sentence might also be given weight by
Minnesota courts in applying the equal protection provision in
the first: that the listing of a category such as sex with the
traditionally more favored categories of race, color, creed, and
national origin might lead courts to apply a similar standard in
determining the constitutionality of legislation.
The committee also wished to indicate the areas in which
discrimination should be prohibited. These areas are identical
to those found in the Minnesota civil rights statute 127 except for
the addition of "services," which represented an attempt to work
towards the elimination of discrimination in such things as ob-
taining financing or credit.
3. The Right to Know
Particularly in light of the development of sophisticated
eavesdropping and wiretapping devices, the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee was especially concerned about safeguarding the right
to privacy and sought testimony in this area. However, the
only proposal submitted to the committee concerned the right
of the individual to know about, inspect, and challenge infor-
mation being collected concerning him. Although no constitu-
tional provisions elsewhere contain such a right, the new con-
stitution recently submitted to the voters of Montana 128 has a
right to know provision in its bill of rights.
The committee believed that the currently available non-
constitutional remedies provide inadequate protection. A fed-
eral statute1 29 requires credit reporting agencies to notify an
126. MINNESOTA CoNsTITUTIONAL STUDY COMMXISSION, BILL OF RIcHTS
COMMITTEE REPORT 16 (1973).
127. MINN. STAT. § 363 (1973).
128. The thrust of the Montana provision would be to open state
meetings and agencies to the public, but an additional ambiguous refer-
ence to the right to "examine public documents" could arguably allow
an individual to inspect all state records referring to him. MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 9.
129. Credit Reporting Agencies Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
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individual of the existence of investigations and records affect-
ing him and of their nature and substance. However, since the
individual has no right under the statute to examine the record
itself, critics have pointed out that "a defamatory innuendo
might go undiscovered". 130  Furthermore, the statute applies
only in the private sector and only in the narrow area of credit
reports. As to public agencies, it has been suggested that in
certain circumstances an individual might be able to charge the
state with a due process violation where information related to
him is not made available.' 3 '
Since no relevant provision was found in other constitu-
tions, the committee had to rely upon its own drafting skills to
modify the original proposal presented by a law student at the
University of MAinnesota. 132  That proposal contained three par-
agraphs: the first guaranteed the general right of the individual
"to know about or the right to examine ... any files or reports
or records concerning his or her own reputation" gathered by
any organization, corporation or government agency; the second
paragraph provided that no information from such a file could
be disseminated without notifying the subject or recording in
the file the nature of the disclosure and the parties to whom
the information was released; the third paragraph partly ex-
empted government agencies "conducting criminal investiga-
tions."' 33  One complication which immediately became appar-
ent was a potential deleterious effect on the freedom of the press.
However, because the committee felt the right was entitled to
constitutional protection, it attempted to combine a general
statement with a stipulation that the details were to be worked
out by the legislature:
RIGHT TO KNOW. Any organization, corporation, or govern-
ment entity keeping a file on an individual shall notify that in-
dividual of the existence of the file and allow him or her to
examine it. This provision shall be subject to such reasonable
regulation as the Legislature may impose.134
The stipulation of legislative regulation was intended to al-
low the legislature to exempt the press and governmental crim-
130. R. Runbeck, Report to the Minnesota Constitutional Revision
Committee, June 21, 1972, on file at the State Capitol of Minnesota.
131. Interview with Carl Auerbach, Dean of the University of Min-
nesota Law School, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, September, 1972.
132. For a discussion of the underlying need for protection in this
area see Morris, New Horizons for a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L.
REv. 474, 480-81 (1970).
133. R. Runbeck, supra note 130.
134. MnntnsoTA CoNas'U oAL REvmiON Comvnrrrm, BmL OF Ibcmrs
CoyaPr= REPoRT 18 (1973).
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inal investigations from coverage, but the Office of Revisor of
Statutes criticized the wording. According to the Revisor the
preferable drafting practice would be to make the matter "sub-
ject to law."'135 The use of the terms "any organization, corpo-
ration, or government entity" was deliberately far-reaching since
the committee hoped to protect the right against private as well
as public abuse, but the terms probably were not intended to
encompass such things as the records of volunteer organizations
or information gathered by attorneys in building a case. When
such problems were raised, the committee expressed the view
that these questions should be properly considered by the leg-
islature. Moreover, the committee believed that detailed provi-
sions setting forth the proper procedure to be followed when
disseminating information also would be more appropriately
handled by statutory treatment.
4 The Right of Assembly
The right of assembly is one of the basic democratic guaran-
tees found in the first amendment to the Federal Constitution,180
the Model State Constitution, 13 7 and in forty-seven of the state
constitutions.'3 8 Since the right of assembly was contained in
the draft constitutions of both the Republican and Democratic
conventions in 1857, its absence from the Minnesota Constitution
may very well be due only to oversight. 13 9 Addition of this
right to the Minnesota Constitution was one of the recommenda-
tions of the Minnesota Constitutional Commission of 1948, which
called it "a fundamental American Bill of Rights provision. ' 0
The wording recommended by the Bill of Rights Committee
follows that of the Federal Constitution and the proposal of the
1948 commission:
135. Letter from Harry M. Walsh, Acting Assistant Revisor of Stat-
utes, to Diana Murphy, September 18, 1972, on file Minnesota Law Re-
view. Mr. Walsh commented, "There has been considerable difficulty
with constitutional provisions that refer to the legislature in its capacity
as a law making body. If the Committee desires that a matter should
be subject to law, it should use the word 'law'."
136. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 229 (1966) (right of
assembly held applicable to the states).
137. MODEL STATE CONST. art. I, § 1.01.
138. Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the
Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 169 (1969).
139. See generally W. ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF MNNESOTA (1921).
140. REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA 16
(1948).
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THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY. The Legislature shall not abridge
the right of the people to assemble and to petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances.141
Since the right to assemble and the right to petition are stated
separately, this wording would appear to avoid the kind of con-
flict which arose during the Illinois Constitutional Convention
where it was argued that the right was qualified by succeeding
unseparated phrases, i.e., "the right to assemble in a peaceable
manner, to consult for the common good, to make known their
opinions to their representatives, and to apply for redress of
grievances." There, to assure that the right of assembly was an
independent right, even if not absolute, a comma was added
after "manner."'142 However, it might be noted that the concept
of independent rights would have been further strengthened in
the Minnesota proposal if "or" had been used instead of "and"
and if "rights" had been substituted for "right."
While the earlier commission suggested that the right of
assembly be added to section 2 of the Minnesota Bill of Rights
(which has served as the due process and equal protection
section), the recent committee believed that it would be more
logical to add it to section 3 (liberty of the press and free speech)
or insert it as a separate section.
5. Right to Bear Arms
Minnesota is one of a minority of states with no constitu-
tional protection of the right to bear arms. While the second
amendment to the United States Constitution refers to the "right
of the people to keep and bear arms," this right is qualified by
language which indicates that its purpose is to provide for a
militia.143 The view has been expressed that since a militia to-
day is not dependent upon the private possession of weapons, the
amendment does not speak to the right of the individual to bear
arms.144 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the amend-
141. MnNEsoTA CoNsTrIToNAL STUDY CoMMIssIoN, BILL OF RIuHTs
Cowm= REPORT 19 (1973).
142. E. GER=Z, FOR THE F IRST HouRs OF ToMoRnow: THE NmW ILU-
NoIs BILL OF RIGHTS 99 (1972).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. I1: "A well regulated Militia, being nec-
essary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
144. See generally Note, The Impact of State Constitutional Right
to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation, 38 U. CHL
L. REv. 185 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Impact of Right to Bear Arms
Provisions).
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ment restricts only Congress and not the states and has not in-
corporated it into the fourteenth amendment. 145
However, some thirty-six states have arms provisions in
their own constitutions. 146 Some of these expressly allow regu-
lation of the right, and state courts have in any event recognized
that the right is not absolute but may be regulated under the
police power.14 7 The amount of permissible regulation may de-
pend, however, on whether the particular state's provision is
considered a collective or an individual right." 8  If the right is
interpreted as a collective one primarily related in purpose to
providing a militia, it may be found not to protect the private
possession of arms. On the other hand, if the provision is inter-
preted as a guarantee to the private individual, it would prob-
ably prevent an absolute prohibition on private possession and
use. This distinction has remained largely theoretical up to the
present time, since state courts have generally not attempted to
engage in such analysis, but an increase in state gun control leg-
islation might force questions of construction upon the courts.1 4"
Although only recently the right to bear arms was charac-
terized in the literature as an example of a right no longer need-
ing constitutional protection, 5" there appears to be a resurgence
of interest in it, probably because of the move towards gun con-
trol legislation and possibly also because of racial strife. An or-
ganization called The Committee for Effective Crime Control
prepared a memorandum for the Bill of Rights Committee which
included the wording for a suggested amendment to the Minne-
sota Constitution. This group also testified at a public hearing
and organized one of the few lobbying efforts directed at the
members of the Bill of Rights Committee and the other commis-
sioners.
Spokesmen for the group advanced the theory that the ab-
sence of a right to bear arms provision in the Minnesota Con-
stitution was due to the unique circumstances surrounding its
origin. The Republicans and Democrats elected to the constitu-
tional convention of 1857 refused to meet together but instead
drafted separate documents. A conference committee then met
145. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
146. Impact of Right to Bear Arms Provisions, supra note 144, at
187.
147. Id. at 187-89.
148. Id. at 194.
149. Id. at 193.
150. See J. WuHs.nn, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 17
(1961).
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and reported back to the separate conventions which adopted the
constitution individually.151 Under the Crime Control Commit-
tee's view, the right to bear arms provision, included in the Re-
publican draft but not in the Democratic draft, was not proposed
by the conference committee merely because the committee al-
legedly followed the policy of retaining only those sections con-
tained in both drafts. The Committee for Effective Crime Con-
trol stressed that "[n] ot a word was spoken against the amend-
ment by either party in the published debates."15 2
In addition to stating the right of the individual "to acquire,
possess and use arms," the group's proposed amendment added
the provision that "[n] o license or registration tax or fee shall
ever be imposed on this right."' 53 At least one member of the
committee feared that such a provision might be used to prevent
any kind of registration of weapons although the proponent
denied that it would have such effect. The words "possess and
use arms" were selected in preference to the common usage of
"keep and bear arms" because the drafters apparently felt this
would prevent an interpretation that the right was limited by
being associated with the militia.
Two members of the Bill of Rights Committee wished to
adopt the proposal as offered, and under the rules of the com-
mittee, majority approval was sufficient for adoption. The chair-
man, however, was concerned that the proposed wording might
rule out almost any kind of gun control legislation and noted
that it was more far-reaching than any provisions currently
found in state constitutions. Although the chairman preferred
that no amendment be proposed in this area, she offered a sub-
stitute modeled upon a recent addition to the Illinois Constitu-
tion:
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS. Subject only to the police power,
the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed.154
Reports of the work of the Bill of Rights Committee of the
Illinois Constitutional Convention indicate that such wording
was a compromise solution there. 5 5 The right was intentionally
placed in the individual, and it was intended to guarantee that
151. See W. ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITuTION OF MINE-
SOTA (1921).
152. The Committee for Effective Crime Control, Memorandum to
the Bill of Rights Committee, May 22, 1972, on file State Capitol of
Minnesota.
153. Id.
154. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 22.
155. E. GERTz, supra note 142, at 109-10.
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no complete ban on the use or possession of arms could be
enacted, but that under the police power a wide range of
regulatory measures would be available to the state. This
substitute proved acceptable to the majority of the Minnesota
committee and was accordingly adopted as a recommendation
over the dissent of the chairman. In its report the committee
indicated that while the majority believed that the right to bear
arms should be included in the constitution, the committee as
a whole did not want "to foreclose reasonable legislative meas-
ures for the control of crime"'56 and therefore preferred the Illi-
nois language. Since the committee was informed about current
efforts of the state attorney general to obtain legislation to re-
strict the sale of handguns,157 it might be inferred that this form
of gun control was an example of what was considered "reason-
able."
6. Recommended Deletions and Modification
From its study of the present bill of rights in the Minnesota
Constitution, the committee concluded that it could be improved
by deletion of unnecessary sections, transfer of one section, and
the modification of another under which some difficulties have
arisen. The committee recommended the deletion of two sec-
tions which appear to be obsolete:
TREASON DEFINED. Sec. 9. Treason against the State shall
consist only in levying war against the same, or in adhering to
its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to
the same overt act, or on confession in open court. 155
LANDS DECLARED ALLODIAL; LEASES, WHEN VOID. Sec.
15. All lands within the State are declared allodial, and
feudal tenures of every description, with all their incidents, are
prohibited. Leases and grants of agricultural lands for a longer
period than twenty-one years hereafter made, in which shall be
reserved any rent or service of any kind, shall be void. 159
Although treason against the United States is covered in ar-
ticle III of the United States Constitution, the crime of treason
against the state is invariably found in the bills of rights of the
state constitutions. Thirty-eight states define the crime in the
bill of rights in a manner similar to the Minnesota definition,
and 37 states also include the requirement for two witnesses
156. M SINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY ComIssIoN, BILL OF RIGHTS
COMMITTEE REPORT 19 (1973).
157. Byron Starnes, Assistant Attorney General, testified on behalf
of Attorney General Warren Spannaus at the hearing on June 21, 1972.
158. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 9.
159. AMNN. CoNsT. art. I, § 15,
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in order to convict.'6 0 Since the Supreme Court's decision
in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,161 it has been clear that congressional
preemption prevents the states from using such clauses as a ba-
sis for regulating treason against the United States. Neverthe-
less, it remains constitutionally permissible for a state to seek
to regulate treason against itself.
From a realistic point of view, however, it appeared to the
committee that today treason is a problem for the federal gov-
ernment rather than for the states and that the presence of such
a section in the Minnesota Constitution serves no real purpose.
In any case, the committee felt the legislature needed no con-
stitutional authorization for the statutory crime of treason found
in the Criminal Code.162 Deletion of the section would make
treason merely a matter of statute, and to the committee it ap-
peared to be an excellent example of the kind of constitutional
surplusage which should be removed.
The section on allodial lands has no federal counterpart and
analogous provisions are not commonly found in state consti-
tutions.163 In its recommendation of deletion, the committee re-
lied on the study made by the 1948 commission'6 and its own
perusal of the case law. 65 The committee was not aware of any
continuing need in Minnesota for a constitutional limitation on
agricultural holdings. However, the Revisor's Office believed
that "the problems dealt with by ... Section 15 are not neces-
sarily extinct" and that deletion would "permit a somewhat
greater variety of interests in agricultural lands to exist."166
It was also argued that the allodial concept in the first sentence
needs to be retained to ensure that some form of feudal tenure
could not be established in the future. 67
160. COLu-mIA UNVErIY LEGISLATrvE DRAF NG RESEARCH FUND, IN-
DEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1959).
161. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
162. MNxt. STAT. § 609.385 (1973).
163. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 10, on which it was modeled has been re-
pealed. See criticism in R. DisEMAN, STATE CoNsTr oNs: THE SHAPE
OF THE DocumENT 4(1960).
164. The 1948 commission advocated its removal because the sec-
tion "serves no useful purpose and can be eliminated without adverse
effect." REPORT or THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA 19
(1948).
165. While there are very few Minnesota cases arising under this
section and none since 1940, the lease provision, as in other jurisdic-
tions, has been construed to apply only where the land is to be used for
agricultural purposes. Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corp.,
207 Minn. 126, 290 N.W. 222 (1940); State v. Evans, 99 Minn. 220,
108 N.W. 958 (1906).
166. Letter from Harry M. Walsh, supra note 135.
167. Interview with Robert Stein, Professor of Law, University of
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In addition to the two deletions it recommended, the com-
mittee supported the suggestion of the Structure and Form Com-
mittee that section 18 be moved from the bill of rights to a re-
vised article XIII. Section 18, which allows farmers to sell their
products without a license, is unique to the Minnesota Constitu-
tion and is often cited by commentators as one of the more inter-
esting curiosities to be found in state constitutions.""8 This sec-
tion was added to the Minnesota Bill of Rights in 1906 by an
overwhelming vote to create a special favored position for the
farmer. 169 No dissatisfaction with the section itself was ex-
pressed by either committee of the commission, but the view of
both was that the subject matter was inappropriate for the bill
of rights.
The final change proposed by the Bill of Rights Committee
was to add a new sentence at the end of section 12. Section 12
in its original form 170 only outlawed imprisonment for debt
and provided that some property could be declared exempt
from seizure for payment. However, in 1888 the section was
amended 171 to authorize the imposition of mechanics liens, which
the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously not allowed on
homestead property on the ground that it belonged within the
exempt category.'7 2 Since the Minnesota lien statute 78 has been
criticized because it does not require that the homeowner be
given actual notice of the imposition of the lien, the Attorney
Genera1'7 4 has suggested that a requirement be added to the
constitutional section which would assure that notice be given
the owner.
The committee wished to introduce the principle of notice
to the section without functioning in a legislative capacity and
hoped to achieve these goals with the addition of the following
Minnesota, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 31, 1973. Professor Stein
offered some criticism of the first sentence, however, in so far as it
contains the words "with their incidents" but fails to add "and serv-
ices." Professor Stein argues that this could be read to allow an
agreement to turn over land forever at a fixed price since "services"
is excluded.
168. See R. RANKIN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: BILL OF RIGHTS 4 (1960).
169. See W. ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF =rm CONSTrrTON OF MINtE-
SOTA 157 (1921).
170. Id. at 156.
171. Id.
172. Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N.W. 513 (1888); Cogel v.
Mickow, 11 Minn. 475 (11 Gil. 354) (1886).
173. MINN. STAT. § 514 (1971).
174. Letter from Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, to Elmer
Andersen, Chairman of the Constitutional Study Commission, fall, 1972,
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sentence: "The Legislature may reasonably regulate the form
and notice of such liens."'17 5 Although the committee wished to
avoid specifying how such notice was to be assured, the sug-
gested sentence may be criticized in that its form is too vague
to establish the intended guarantee of the right of notice to the
homeowner at the time the lien is imposed. Furthermore, the
sentence was open to the criticism that constitutional provisions
should be made "subject to law" rather than to such reasonable
regulation as the legislature may provide.1" 6
7. Areas of Concern in Which Provisions Were Not Recom-
mended
A number of other proposals were suggested to the commit-
tee which, for a variety of reasons, were not adopted. In addi-
tion, there were several other rights in which the committee
had some interests but which found no advocates in those per-
sons appearing before it.
One area which was the focus of considerable public atten-
tion but which did not seem to lend itself to constitutional treat-
ment related to persons in the state prisons. Eight states have
provisions in their bills of rights that concern prisons, providing
for safe or healthy prisons or prisons based on the principles of
reformation.17 7 There was disagreement among the persons tes-
tifying in Minnesota as to whether prisoners' rights should be
mentioned in the constitution. The Commissioner of the De-
partment of Corrections 7 8 testified that administrative and leg-
islative action would be sufficient to alleviate whatever prob-
lems exist. The chief spokesman for a constitutional amend-
ment 79 admitted that almost all of the measures which he advo-
cated could be accomplished through other means, but he argued
that there was nonetheless a need for a fundamental guarantee
of prisoners' rights such as that found in the United Nations
1955 Bill of Rights for prisoners. The kinds of rights mentioned
to the committee included the right to counsel at disciplinary
175. MnzNmoTA CoNsTrTuTIoNAL STuDY ComlnussIo, BILL Op MUXHMS
CoMrn REPoRT 19 (1973).
176. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
177. ALAs. CoNsT. art. I, § 12; DEL. CoNsT. art I, § 11; In. CoNsT.
art. 1, § 18; MoNT. CoNsT. art. I § 28; N.H. CONST. art. I, § 18; ORE.
CONST. art. I, § 15; TEm. CONST. art. I, § 32; Wyo. CoNST. art. I, § 16.
178. David Fogel
179. Thomas Murton, Murton Foundation for Criminal Justice, Inc.
and Professor in Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Minne-
sota.
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
hearings, freedom from censorship, end to indeterminate sen-
tencing, right to fair compensation for work, and visiting rights.
No proposed language for a prisoners' rights section was sub-
mitted to the committee, and it indicated in its report that it
believed the issues presented were "matters for the legisla-
ture"'80 rather than for the constitution.
Proposals were also made to the committee to provide con-
stitutional protection for homosexuals. The original proposal
was to amend section 16, an anti-establishment section guaran-
teeing the freedom of religion and conscience, to state that "the
enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed
to deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people
including jus societatis congeneratae."'' The phrase was coined
by a Latin professor to suggest a union of persons similar in na-
ture, and it was apparently offered in the belief that it would
be more acceptable to the public than the term "homosex-
ual.' 82 Subsequently the proponents suggested as an alterna-
tive that jus societatis congeneratae be included in a general
equality of rights section such as the committee was consider-
ing. The committee majority rejected the proposals largely for
the reason "that it is not possible to include every group in the
constitution.' 8 3
Other proposals urged upon the committee included the cre-
ation of a constitutional office of ombudsman and a section guar-
anteeing access to certain services without regard to income.
Constitutional language was suggested only for the latter in a
proposal to guarantee "the right to available and adequate health
care, to the benefits of higher education and to legal assistance
without regard to the individual's ability to pay.'' 4 With the
exception of the right to education without regard to income,
which appears in the North Carolina Constitution,'I8 rights such
as these have not been included in any state bills of rights, al-
though some commentators believe that they represent emerg-
180. MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, BILL OF RIGHTS
COMMITTEE REPORT 22 (1973).
181. Prepared statement to the Bill of Rights Committee on June 21,
1972, by Jack Baker, then president of the Minnesota Student Association.
182. Testimony of Mr. Baker at the hearing on June 21, 1972.
183. MINNEsOTa CoNSTnUIoNAL STUDY COMMISSION, BILL OF RIGHTS
COMMITTEE REPORT 22 (1973). One member supported constitutional
protection for homosexuals but was opposed to use of the Latin phrase.
184. Letter from John Milton (subsequently elected state senator)
to Diana Murphy, August, 1972, on file State Capitol of Minnesota.
185. N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 15: "The people have a right to the privi-
lege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and main-
tain that right."
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ing rights which may eventually achieve constitutional status. 80
Although the committee was interested in the ombudsman pro-
posal, it believed that there was not yet sufficient support for
such a section in Minnesota. Since one type of ombudsman had
just been created in the Department of Corrections, the commit-
tee believed that it would be wise to observe the results of that
experiment before elevating the concept to constitutional status.
Support was also voiced for the inclusion of provisions relat-
ing to abortion, the rights of juveniles, and Indian rights, but no
suggested amendments were offered. The committee preferred
to leave the question of abortion to the legislature. While
abortion has become a major constitutional issue because of the
Supreme Court's decision invalidating many state abortion
laws, 8 7 experience at the Illinois Constitutional Convention had
already indicated the divisive role the issue can play in constitu-
tional revision. In that convention, much time and energy was
taken up by the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to add the un-
born to the protection of life guaranteed in the due process sec-
tion.18 In the area of Indian rights the committee had sought
out testimony from Indian people, but the only issue raised be-
fore it related to a very specific problem in regard to inter-
racial marriages.
In sum, as the committee stated, the explanation of its fail-
ure to recommend proposals in these areas was that "they were
not constitutional issues, or... too little information was avail-
able as background, or... there was little apparent public in-
terest." 89
D. AcTIoN TAEN ON Conmxr RECOMMENDATIONS
The first important decision made by the commission was to
decide whether to recommend that a constitutional convention
be called. Those who opposed the calling of a convention argued
that the need in Minnesota for constitutional revision was not
acute because of the beneficial effect of the 1948 commission,'9 0
that there was no evidence of public interest in a convention,
and that a more reasoned approach could be assured with an
186. See R. RANN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: BnLL OF RIGHTS 19 (1960).
187. Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. Jauary 22, 1973).
188. E. GERTz, supra note 142, at 32-35.
189. Mnlu som CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY CommISsIoN, BILL OF RIcHTS
CoAnnusE REPORT 22 (1973).
190. See MnqNsoTA CoNsTrUONAL STUDY CoMmissroN, FnAL RE-
Poar 10 (1973).
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appointed commission. The minority preference for revision by
an elected convention was based on the belief that the citizens
of the state should be involved to the greatest extent possible
and that only a convention would ensure the full exploration of
all the issues. With regard to the bill of rights in particular, at
least one member of the minority felt that a convention would
be more receptive to change in that area. After much delibera-
tion, the commission decided to recommend to the legislature
that constitutional revision in Minnesota be carried out by a
phased program of periodic submission of sections to the electo-
rate rather than by the calling of a constitutional convention.
Under its phased program of revision, the commission sub-
sequently adopted a priority list of five amendments which it
recommended to the legislature for action in 1973: (1) a single
amendment encompassing the changes in form and organization
of the constitution as worked out by the Structure and Form
Committee; (2) a gateway amendment which would make future
change easier by lowering the percentage of the popular vote re-
quired to pass amendments, providing for the submission of
amendments at special elections, easing the calling of a constitu-
tional convention, and providing for citizen initiative of amend-
ments dealing with legislative structure; (3) an amendment pro-
viding for a commission to reapportion the legislature period-
ically; (4) an amendment allowing the state to levy taxes com-
puted as a percentage of federal taxes; and (5) an amendment
repealing the gross earnings tax paid by railroads in lieu of other
taxes. 19 The commission also adopted many other recommen-
dations proposed by the individual committees with the intent
that these recommendations would be acted on in future legisla-
tive sessions.
The commission's action regarding the proposals for the bill
of rights can only be understood in relation to the sequence of
their presentation. A number of commissioners believed from
the outset that no real purpose was to be served by having a
committee study the bill of rights. Others, while having no ob-
jection to the organization of such a committee, did not feel that
the bill of rights was one of the priority areas for the commis-
sion's work or that it involved the same urgency as other prob-
lem areas. When the committee presented its recommendations
at the September meeting, not only were these underlying at-
titudes articulated, but a number of commissioners also voiced
specific objections to some of the proposals. Several commission-
191. Id. at 36-37.
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ers objected to singling out any particular group for constitu-
tional protection on the ground that it was unfair to other
groups in society.192 Another argument was that inclusion of
a particular group in an amendment to the bill of rights would
imply that the group had not been afforded protection in the
past, an implication that the proponent of the argument appar-
ently felt was either unjustified or impolitic. 9 3
Not only was it apparent that the commission was reluctant
to single out certain categories of persons in the constitution,
such as the mentally disabled and those included in the draft
proposal on equality of rights, but it was also clear that it ob-
jected to other features of the drafting. The language of the
proposed section on the rights of the mentally disabled, 94 which
had been copied from section 2 of the Minnesota Bill of Rights,
was criticized as being vague and unclear. Accordingly, it was
suggested that "unless by the law of the land or judgment of his
peers" be replaced by "except by due process of law" to clarify
its meaning.195 A motion was then made to lay the proposal over
until the next meeting so that it might be redrafted. The sug-
gested section on inviolability of the body'90 was criticized as
being too detailed for a constitutional guarantee, and it was al-
leged that it could be interpreted to cover abortion and blood
transfusions. After voting not to adopt this proposal, the com-
mission decided to adjourn until after the election.
The unfavorable reaction to the bill of rights report at the
September commission meeting caused the committee to revise
its proposals before the November meeting. After consulting
with one of the most influential critics of the proposals, the com-
mittee decided to submit a due process and equal protection sec-
tion in place of the recommended sections on the rights of the
192. This argument was made by the labor representative and
by one of the law professors. Constitutional drafting experts also cau-
tion that courts may apply the canon of construction expressio unius
est exclusio alterius to hold that a group not specifically mentioned
could not be protected under a provision in which a number of groups
are listed. F. GaA, supra note 2, at 29 (Content of State Constitu-
tions: Criteria for Inclusion and Exclusion).
193. The proponent was Senator Jack Davies.
194. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
195. This kind of change was also recommended for the New York
Constitution. Since "law of the Land" has been held to be synonomous
with "due process of law," it is felt that it is better drafting practice to
use that woiding which is generally accepted. See REPonT OF THE
SPECIAL CoiVnwrTTEs ON THE CoNsTrrUoNAL CONVENION OF THE AssociA-
ON OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, BmLL OF RIG Ts 3 (1967).
196. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
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mentally disabled, equality of rights, and the right to know.
The committee took this course because it believed that there
was no chance that the three proposals would be accepted by the
commission and that at least some of their objectives could be
accomplished with such a provision. The wording of the pro-
posed section was almost identical to that of the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the
laws. The Legislature shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this section.' 97
One of the sharpest critics of the bill of rights proposals moved
to strike the words "have power to" so that the sentence would
read "shall enforce," urging that the wording be made manda-
tory on the legislature. The committee chairman was put in the
position of being able to decide the issue since there was a tie
vote of the other commissioners. Because she feared that the
mandatory language would provide a means by which the whole
section would be defeated, 198 she voted against the change.
The committee hoped that many of the rights which it had
sought to protect with its original proposals could be raised un-
der such a section. While the advantage of expressing a special
concern in the constitution for the mentally disabled and the
groups specified in the equality of rights proposal would be lost,
there would be a gain in flexibility. However, such a clause did
not go as far as the committee had hoped in providing protection
against discrimination since it would only apply to state action
and would not cover the handicapped or provide adequate safe-
guards against sex discrimination. 99 As far as the right to know
was concerned, the committee realized that the only possibility
for raising it under the section would be in cases involving state
agencies and that even there it would be problematic, but at the
same time it was aware of the potential problems created by the
overbroad language of its original proposal.20 0
The committee wished to maintain some innovative influ-
197. MINNEsoTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, BILL OF RIGHTS
COMITTEE REPORT 15 (1973). The proposal made no reference to sec-
tion 2 which presumably would therefore also remain in the article.
198. There had been instances when proposals of other committees
had been amended by a commissioner who subsequently opposed the
amended proposal. Although the ostensible purpose of the amendment
in those cases had been to improve the measure, its real effect was to
decrease its potential supporters.
199. See text accompanying notes 111-114 supra.
200. See text following note 140 supra,
[Vol. 58:157
MINNESOTA BILL OF RIGHTS
ence by including with the proposed constitutional section two
resolutions urging the legislature to implement the section in
specific ways:
The Legislature should implement the ... [above section] by
such legislation as will protect groups which have suffered
inequities and discrimination. This legislation should assure due
process rights to the mentally ill and mentally retarded and
provide protection for all persons regardless of race, religion,
sex, national or social origin, physical handicap, or mental ill-
ness or mental retardation.
The Legislature should implement [this section) by laws
which will protect the individual's right to access to informa-
tion collected and preserved relative to him. 201
These resolutions were quickly adopted after very minor altera-
tion 20 2 and thus became a part of the commission's final recom-
mendations to the legislature.
The commission also voted to recommend that the right of
assembly section be added to the Minnesota Bill of Rights, but it
never voted on the proposed deletion of obsolete sections since
the committee withdrew these proposals from consideration. The
committee had no evidence that the inclusion of the provisions
had any harmful effect, and the objections raised to their re-
moval by the Office of the Revisor of Statutes caused it to recon-
sider its position.
The commission handled the right to bear arms provision in
a different manner from the other proposals. The Attorney
General made a special appearance before the commission to
urge that the right to bear arms provision be defeated, arguing
that while it would not legally prevent gun control legislation,
its approval might make the passage of such legislation politi-
cally more difficult in that it would be viewed as a victory for
opponents of gun control. Little support for the section was
voiced except from the one committee member in attendance
who had supported the measure; but nonetheless the commis-
201. fnmEsoT_ CoNsTrrUTIoNAL STUDY COmmISSION, FINAL REPoRT
15 (1973).
202. In the resolution relating to the proposed due process and equal
protection section the words "the mentally ill or mentally retarded"
were inserted in place of "the mentally disabled" at the instance of
Chairman Andersen who believed they were more accurate and car-
ried less of a negative connotation. For the same reason "physical
handicap, or mental illness or mental retardation" were substituted for
"physical or mental handicap."
The resolution relating to the right to know was altered to im-
prove its style. "Access to information collected and preserved rela-
tive to him" was substituted for the original wording "access to in-
formation collected and stored on him" at the suggestion of Representa-
tive Dirlam.
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sion chose to dispense with the item by tabling the motion rather
than by possibly facing a roll call vote which would force the
commissioners to reveal their positions on this controversial is-
sue. However, since the chairman of the commission explained
before the vote that the effect of the motion to table would be to
kill the measure, the vote may be interpreted as representing
the commission's opposition to inclusion of a right to bear arms
section in the Minnesota Constitution.
The proposal to amend section 12 in reference to mechanics
liens led to a decision to recommend that a future commission
examine the question of whether the section should be amended
or entirely deleted from the constitution. It was pointed out in
the discussion that the proposed amendment would have no legal
effect since the legislature already had the power to regulate
the notice and form of such liens, but some commissioners be-
lieved that the section should incorporate a guarantee that notice
to the property owner be required. Others suggested that there
was no need for any reference to mechanics liens in the constitu-
tion because the subject matter is one that can and should be
handled by statute. Since the original inclusion of the subject
in the constitution was to counteract judicial decisions,20 3 the
mechanics lien section resembles the workmen's compensation
provision in the New York Bill of Rights which is often used to
illustrate the kind of provision once necessary but retained in
the constitution only out of timidity once its function has been
served.20 4
Some of the issues which concerned the committee were sub-
sequently presented to the legislature in the form of proposed
statutes2° 5 and, despite the priorities of the commission's phased
203. See W. ANDERSoN, A ISTORY OF THE CoNsTmTUON OF MINNE-
SOTA 156 (1921).
204. See F. GRAD, supra note 2, at 19-20 (Content of State Constitu-
tions: Criteria for Inclusion and Exclusion).
205. One bill would appear to meet many of the deficiencies of the
present mechanics lien law. It would require notice to the home-
owner before a lien could be imposed and would allow the homeowner
to delay his payment to the contractor until the subcontractors are
paid or to make the payment directly to the subcontractors. H.F. No.
711, S.F. No. 6. Gun control legislation which has been introduced
would require a permit for the purchase of hand guns or for carrying
them on the street or in a car; one of the objectives is to prohibit the
possession of handguns by persons convicted of crimes of violence, al-
coholics and drug addicts, the mentally ill, and those under eighteen.
H.F. No. 791, S.F. No. 806. While such a statute would probably be
upheld under the type of right to bear arms amendment advocated by
the committee's majority, there would be greater question as to its le-
gality under an amendment such as the one proposed by the Citizenq for
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plan, also in the form of a constitutional amendment The
senator member of the Bill of Rights Committee -2 0 0 plans to in-
troduce a constitutional amendment based on the commission's
proposal for-a due process and equal protection provision. Except
for this amendment, it is impossible to assess what influence,
if any, the work of the Bill of Rights Committee may have had
on the development of legislation, although its work may have
been a factor 20° in the process which led to the ratification of the
federal equal rights amendment in Minnesota..2 0 8
Since the commission decided on a phased program of
amendment, it remains unclear when, if ever, its recommenda-
tions for the bill of rights will come before the legislature. If
a new commission is appointed to carry out the program as the
present commission suggested, there is no guarantee that it
would simply adopt the present recommendations. However, it
seems likely that such a group would rely at least to some extent
on the final report of the commission and the committee reports
in the individual constitutional areas. Nevertheless, it is too soon
to ascertain whether the effort to revise the bill of rights in
Minnesota will bear any direct fruit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even though the Federal Bill of Rights plays a predominant
role in the development of constitutional law and usage in the
courts, there is also a significant function for the bill of rights
in state constitutions. Recent constitutional revision activities in-
dicate that there is considerable interest in revising these bills
of rights to make them more effective by removing obsolete sec-
tions and by incorporating additional rights.
The effort to revise the Minnesota Bill of Rights illustrates
some of the difficulties involved in such an undertaking and
Effective Crime Control (See text accompanying note 144 supra.) In
the area of equal rights, there appears to be substantial support for
proposals to extend the coverage of the civil rights statute to protect
against discrimination on the basis of sex in the areas of education,
real property, public accommodations and public services, in addition
to employment, and to include the handicapped in the statute in the
area of employment. In the latter case, the discrimination prohibited
would specifically be that unrelated to bona fide occupational qualifi-
cations. H.F. No. 377, S.F. No. 419. (In the house version protection
for the disabled also would be provided in the areas of property, educa-
tion, public accommodations and public services.)
206. Robert J. Brown.
207. Interview with Diana E. Murphy, Chairman of the Bill of
Rights Committee, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, January 10, 1973.
208. Minn. Laws 1973, Resolution No. 1 (H.F. No. 3).
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also some of the objectives. While the Bill of Rights Committee
and many members of the public believed that there would be
value in including additional rights in the constitution, this posi-
tion was met with a certain skepticism on the part of many com-
missioners. Their resistance to the committee's recommenda-
tions was only partly based on a different philosophy, however,
for the draft proposals were not perfectly drafted. The absence
of staff assistance was probably critical in the drafting areas, al-
though the chairman believed that the problem might have been
alleviated if the committee's proposals had been submitted ear-
lier to the Office of the Revisor of Statutes. In any event, the
amount of assistance the Revisor could have furnished could not
have equalled that available in states where the appropriation
for revision efforts was appreciably greater. A comparison
of the Minnesota experience with other states also suggests that
a constitutional convention may be more interested in exam-
ining the bill of rights area than a commission dominated by
legislators, who may be more conservative in their approach to
constitutional change and are probably most interested in revi-
sion as a tool to remove obstacles which hamper legislative ac-
tion.
The Minnesota experience also indicates that bill of rights
revision efforts in general could be made more effective. The
work in the various states is inevitably repetitive, and all could
benefit by better communication. More study of the function
which present state provisions have performed is needed to al-
low an analysis of their utility and to suggest ways in which
state bills of rights could be made more useful. Further study
of the possible need to guarantee additional fundamental rights
in a time of social and technological change should be combined
with efforts to draft such provisions in model form.
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